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‘Fluid fields’ and the dynamics of risk in social research 
Abstract 
In recent decades social scientists have expanded their understanding of risk in the field 
to extend from concern with participants to awareness of how researchers themselves 
may be exposed to a variety of physical, emotional, ethical and professional ‘dangers’. A 
variety of accounts have exposed the kinds of risks concerned with fieldwork, many of 
which are difficult to anticipate. However, this paper takes a further step forward in 
considering the ways in which risks combine in the field, the coalescence of risk in 
particular circumstances, and the ways in which risk should be understood as dynamic 
and unpredictable. The paper concludes that these considerations require researchers to 
take a leading role in assessing the risks that they face, that risks should not be considered 
as uniform for all team members in conjunction with projects involving multiple 
researchers, and that researchers should receive greater training on appropriate risk 
management in an effort to change the prevailing research culture in many institutions. 
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A degree of risk may reasonably be considered to be associated with most disciplinary 
areas of academic work. The laboratories of natural scientists engaged in work with 
chemicals, pathogens, lasers, and radio-active particles readily spring to mind as potential 
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sites of physical risk. However, qualitative social science research is relatively unique in 
combining a variety of risks that have only come to be better appreciated in recent years. 
As such we now have a body of literature that considers risks of a physical (Lee-Treweek 
and Linkogle 2000, Jacques and Wright 2010, Barr and Welch 2012), emotional (Burr 
1996, Etherington 1996, Sampson and Bloor 2008, Bloor et al 2008, Coles and Mudaly 
2010, Benoot and Bilsen 2015), ethical (Pearson 2009, Palmer 2010), and professional 
nature (Possick 2009). We have also seen concerns being picked up in a variety of 
national contexts with risk now achieving greater attention in countries where it was 
hitherto under-explored (Benoot and Bilsen 2015, Bahn 2012, Bahn and Weatherill 2012, 
Fahie 2014). 
 
Some accounts have helpfully differentiated between different kinds of risk with ambient 
risk being identified as attached to particular settings and situational risks being carried 
by researchers into the field by virtue of their own identities and actions (Lee 1995). This 
has led to the development of an understanding of the ways in which such risks might 
combine with ambient risk acting to ‘amplify’ situational risk in specific settings 
(Sampson and Thomas 2003). For example, the risks of being a female researcher in an 
all-male institutionalised setting are amplified on a cargo ship at sea given that this 
represents a research site which is impossible to leave (Sampson and Thomas 2003).  
 
There is a considerable body of literature that has developed in relation to research in 
settings which are known to be high risk (for a recent review see Sluka 2015). Many 
authors have offered insightful accounts of research in settings which are known to be 
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violent and where conflict and violence may be the focus for their research. Most 
recently, for example,  work has elaborated on research undertaken within conflict zones 
(e.g. Browne 2013), on the trauma that might be associated with undertaking work with 
secondary sources (e.g. Kiyimba and O’Reilly 2015, Jackson et al 2013, Etherington 
2007), and importantly on the long term impact that research in high risk contexts may 
have on researchers in the field. As such, in a powerful account of the development of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in a violent field setting, and the failure to 
rapidly understand and recognise this, Tara Warden reminds us that the impact of danger 
in the field can be life changing. She explains: 
I began to realize why, when I looked in the mirror, I did not recognize the person 
looking back at me. These actual neurological changes in cases of PTSD mean that 
I am not the same person I was when I embarked on the ethnography and never will 
be again. Trying to return to being that person again was an unrealistic expectation 
and that this is the person I am now [...] (Warden 2013:167) 
 
Many insightful accounts have offered guidance relating to the protection of researchers 
in the field. This advice has broadly focused on making proper preparations for fieldwork 
where risks can be anticipated as a result of the location of the research (e.g. Williams et 
al 1992, Nordstrom and Robben 1995, Lee 1995) and/or the focus of the research (Lee 
and Stanko 2003, Porter et al 2005, Dickson-Swift et al 2007) but it has also included 
practical strategies that might be adopted as a component of fieldcraft to mitigate risk 
(Sluka 2015, Lee 1995, Sampson and Thomas 2003, Fahie 2014). Researchers have also 
devoted some attention to risks that are usually less well-anticipated such as emotional 
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and professional risks and a recent ‘inquiry’ into researcher risk highlighted the extent to 
which emotional risk is increasingly acknowledged in unanticipated settings (Bloor et al 
2008). This paper seeks to build upon such understandings of risk by considering 
unanticipated risks arising in the more prosaic setting of a ‘workplace’. The paper 
incorporates a discussion of how risk varies, combines, and changes as researchers 
become established fieldworkers highlighting the ways in which knowledge of a field 
setting and experience of fieldcraft cannot be presumed to be sufficient in guarding 
against risk. As such, risks are not considered individually, in metaphoric silos, but with 
their fluidity and dynamics (Peterson 2000) at a micro level given clearer focus than has 
been the case, hitherto1. For this reason, the paper will incorporate the argument that it is 
important that risk is not conceived of as static, as discrete, or as predictable. Where risks 
are ‘fluid’, researchers need to be particularly well-equipped to assess danger in the field 
and to know how to mitigate it. This requires more than preparation and anticipation prior 
to fieldsite entry and it requires an understanding that experienced researchers conducting 
work in a familiar field need to attend to risk mitigation as carefully as ‘novices’ who 
have been noted in the literature as potentially most vulnerable when entering the field 
(Rogers-Dillon 2005, Benoot and Bilsen 2015. The paper ends with a consideration of 
some of the ways in which organisations engaged in social research, such as universities, 
                                                 
1 It is helpful to distinguish here between risks associated with a setting i.e. risks associated with a 
research ‘landscape’ such as a war zone and risks relating to interactions between individuals and not 
arising from the research ‘landscape’ as such. Risks associated with the research landscape are generally 
understood to fluctuate (and have been regarded as dynamic in the literature) but in ways that might be 
generally anticipated in advance  i.e. a ‘front line’ may move and shelling commence, or a cargo ship may 
enter the ‘teeth’ of a typhoon. Researchers cannot know the timing of such events or whether they will 
happen at all but they can prepare in general terms for what they should do if the events occur. Micro 
level events and ‘situational risk’ is much less predictable and the highly fluid nature of this risk has been 
under-considered in the broad literature on research risk 
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could and should improve their approaches to risk management and risk reduction. This 
can be achieved, in part, by moving away from a reliance on formal approaches to ‘risk 
management’ (which may permit/create undesirable barriers to research) and towards 
strategies which aim to create more pervasive changes to attitudes and research culture. 
Methods 
The paper draws upon experiences of risk in the field whilst undertaking shipboard 
fieldwork over a period of 17 years. This has been largely qualitative in nature and a 
considerable amount of it has been ethnographic. Here specific experiences in the course 
of two voyages are drawn upon2. These were undertaken twelve years apart as part of 
different studies. The voyage aboard Qui Auora took place as one of five ethnographic 
voyages personally undertaken in conjunction with a study of transnationalism that was 
funded by the ESRC (project reference L214252036). The later voyage aboard the vessel 
Pollyanna (which features first in this account) took place in the introductory phase of 
two studies funded by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation3, The TK Foundation, and Cardiff 
University, in combination. The projects involved ethnographic work in exploring 
seafarers’ experiences of both the use of mandatory equipment on board and (in parallel) 
seafarers’ interaction with shore-side personnel.  This opportunity to engage in shipboard 
research over a sustained period is particularly relevant, as conducting fieldwork in a 
variety of different, but very similar, physical settings has provided the occasion to reflect 
                                                 
2 Pseudonyms are used for ships, personnel and companies 
3 This research was generously supported by the Lloyd’s Register Foundation. Lloyd’s Register Foundation helps to 
protect life and property by supporting engineering-related education, public engagement and the application of 
research.  
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on how risk can vary depending on a variety of factors including changes associated with 
fieldworkers themselves. 
The paper incorporates a discussion of two extended examples of risk drawn from 
voyages on two different ships. These examples will be used to draw out some of the 
aspects of researcher risk which are not effectively addressed in current approaches to 
risk management as practiced in most UK Universities (Bloor et al 2008, Bloor et al 
2010). The paper presents the argument that rather than pursuing bureaucratized 
approaches to risk assessment, and management, greater attention should be paid within 
Universities to efforts to change research and organizational cultures via training and 
targeted awareness raising. 
In the first illustration of risk described here, fieldnotes accompany the text and these are 
presented in the first person. The account offered in the second example also makes use 
of the first person but does not draw upon fieldnotes. The presentation of subsequent 
analysis and discussion returns to a more conventional style. 
 
Unanticipated risks in familiar settings: fieldwork illustrations 
 
Boarding by moonlight 
 
In 2013, I travelled to Panama, to join a product tanker4 which was due to transit the 
Panama Canal before continuing her voyage to destinations that, at the time of 
                                                 
4 A product tanker carries oil products 
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embarkation, were unknown. When joining a cargo vessel, researchers are generally in 
possession of a very limited amount of information as in this industry situations, 
schedules, and on board personnel, are constantly changing. Up to date crew lists, 
schedules of port calls, and likely time of boarding, for example, are rarely available and 
to some extent a researcher simply has to wait and see how things ‘pan out’. Having 
boarded eight previous ships at various ports around the world I had come to appreciate 
this and was used to the associated uncertainly. I was nevertheless taken by surprise when 
I came to board the vessel Pollyanna as I had not been given any indication by the 
company, or agent, that she would not actually be berthed in the port of Colon but would 
simply be ‘passing by’. The following retrospective notes describe the situation that 
emerged on arrival: 
The flight arrived in Panama City late at night and I was met at the airport and driven 
for a couple of hours to a small hotel in Colon where I was instructed to wait for further 
information about when, and where, I would be embarking. When this came, it transpired 
that the vessel would be arriving in the early hours of the morning. I was told to be ready 
for the agent at 2.00am and I was driven through the darkness to a deserted quayside.  
 
The agent who drove me was a young man with a military style of appearance, language, 
and approach. I was extremely tired after travelling and it was with some trepidation, 
therefore, that I learned that the vessel was not alongside as I had understood but that I 
would be joining her in transit...on the move. Ordinarily, for seafarers, agents, and 
pilots, this involves climbing what is termed a ‘pilot ladder’ which is essentially a long 
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rope ladder that is dangled from the ship’s weather deck down to the launch below from 
which people climb up a distance of perhaps thirty, or forty, feet. 
 
To fall from a pilot ladder is frequently fatal. It can result in being crushed between the 
large ship and the tiny launch or being caught by the vessel propeller and rapidly reduced 
to ‘minced meat’. This awareness has triggered the issue of the following marine 
guidance note from the UK maritime Coastguard Agency: 
 
There have been accidents, some fatal, whilst transferring persons between vessels 
making way. A fatal accident occurred on the River Humber when a mooring 
assistant fell whilst transferring between a tug and tanker after losing his footing 
and grip on a ladder. More recently a naval officer fell into the River Thames when 
transferring by ladder from a frigate to a Class V passenger vessel. With the smaller 
vessel secured forward, the painter parted and, as the two vessels separated, the 
ladder spreader became trapped in the bulwark of the smaller vessel.  
The key lessons from such incidents are that trained and fully briefed persons 
should be used to conduct transfers with appropriate risk assessments carried out 
and strict operational procedures followed - particularly in cold, wet and adverse 
sea conditions. These measures will assist in preventing accidents and ensure a 
rapid recovery from the sea should this occur. (Maritime Coastguard Agency 
2011) 
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Notwithstanding such awareness, accidents involving personnel boarding via pilot 
ladders continue to occur. In an accident that happened at anchorage (i.e. on a stationary 
vessel) a few months after I boarded Pollyanna the following pertinent case was reported 
by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau: 
 
On 3 July 2013, a company representative was boarding the bulk carrier Atlantic 
Princess via the ship’s pilot ladder when he fell and landed on the deck of the 
pilot launch below. At the time, the ship was at anchor off Whyalla, South 
Australia, loading iron ore from an offshore transhipment barge.  
The injured man was provided with immediate first aid and transported to the 
local hospital. However, he died later that day as a result of his injuries. 
The ATSB found that while Atlantic Princess’s pilot ladder had been rigged in 
accordance with the relevant international requirements, no further risk 
assessment was carried out for the personnel transfer. The investigation also 
found that the company’s safety management system provided no guidance 
relating to actions that should be taken when less experienced personnel were to 
use a pilot ladder to board or disembark the ship. (Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau 2014) 
The ATSB go on to note that  
This accident highlights the fact that while pilots may be competent in the use of 
pilot ladders, it should not be assumed that other personnel are proficient in 
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climbing or descending a pilot ladder, or fit to do so. (Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau 2014) 
At the time that I joined Pollyanna, I had already joined and left several vessels, on the 
move, over a period of fourteen years undertaking research at sea. However, this had 
never been via a pilot ladder and most companies participating in the research would not 
have permitted me to board or depart in this way. In all previous cases Captains had 
established conditions where it was safe to lower the gangway (metal steps also known as 
the ‘accommodation ladder’) rather than the more precarious rope ladder used by pilots. 
As such, I was ill-prepared for the news that I needed to use the pilot ladder to board 
Pollyanna and was not particularly re-assured by the agent showing me a short film clip 
on his mobile phone of the ‘proper’ way to climb up and then to cross from the ladder on 
to a partially lowered gangway upon which to complete the ascent (this kind of 
arrangement referred to as a ‘combination ladder’ involves the pilot ladder being tied to 
the gangway some distance above the sea level). The fieldnotes continue as follows: 
 
The video clip showed a young tall well-muscled man climbing the rungs of the rope 
ladder with ease, arriving at the junction between the rope ladder and the 
accommodation ladder which was positioned to his right, leaning over to it and stamping 
one foot on the lowest rung to check its stability before transferring his hold from the 
rope [pilot] ladder to the rigging of the gangway. Aware of my own physical limitations, 
I was not convinced that I was fit to undertake this task. I expressed my concerns to the 
agent and asked if it might be possible for the ship to lower the accommodation ladder 
instead. He was dismissive of both my worries ‘sure you can do it! I can see you have got 
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it in you!’ and of my request ‘the pilot has requested a combination ladder, and what the 
pilot asks for goes!’.  
 
The situation presented me with a dilemma. My assessment was that this was an unsafe 
exercise and yet as we made our way towards the vessel my only clear options seemed to 
be to either take the risk or abandon the voyage. I was not keen on either course of 
action5 and therefore maintained pressure on the agent eventually persuading him to 
discuss the matter via VHF radio with the vessel Captain. He did this once the launch was 
underway, and eventually relayed to me, over the noise of the engine, that the Captain 
was willing to use the accommodation ladder. The following notes describe the outcome 
as follows: 
The launch manoeuvred alongside the giant towering shape of Pollyanna. In the 
moonlight she cut a sharp dark ‘stencil’ against the sky. The pilot and two young men set 
about boarding via the combination ladder. I noted the distance between the rungs on the 
pilot ladder and how even with their long legs the effort to swing from one [rung] to 
another was testing. Their breathing became audible and was accompanied by grunts of 
exertion. Finally I was the last passenger on the launch. Pollyanna’s crew set about 
untying the pilot ladder from the gangway in order to lower this to a height just above the 
deck of the little boat. All the time the vessels steadily ploughed forwards in tandem, our 
launch attempting to ‘stand off’ at a distance which was just safe enough to avoid 
collision. The gangway was lowered and one of the two boatman on the little launch 
indicated that I should step onto the edge of the boat where the deck was raised and 
                                                 
5 The costs of organising the trip in relation to time and money were considerable 
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where there were no railings. The launch pitched and rolled as we approached the ship. 
The ocean frothed and somersaulted beneath us and I clung [with one hand] to the roof 
of the cabin behind me whilst waiting for us to arrive in position. Once there I could see 
that the gangway remained rigged for embarkation from the side. Our launch could not 
be positioned in that way and instead she lined up parallel to the opening. This required 
a decisive movement, from any embarking passenger, from the launch to the gangway. It 
involved stepping over a four-foot gap beneath which rushed the turbulent open water 
and grasping for the innermost handrail which was a slightly uncomfortable distance 
away ...about a foot beyond the reach of my outstretched hand. I knew that hesitation 
posed the greatest risk and seized the moment when we arrived at what I judged to be our 
closest point of approach. I lunged forwards, grasped the handrail, kept my balance and 
my footing and found myself on the bottom rung of the accommodation ladder. The relief 
I sensed in the boatman and in the crew who were observing from their vantage point, 
forty feet above, was palpable as I began the long climb to the safety of the deck. 
 
As this scene played out, I was conscious that if it ‘came to it’ and if the conditions, or 
the captain, demanded I would climb the combination ladder notwithstanding my 
reservations. Ignoring all of my instincts and my own personal risk assessment I knew 
with certainty that at this stage in the trip after all the investment of time and money I 
would not abandon the research opportunity.  It was fortunate that previous experience 
and confidence (as an older researcher) knowledge of ships and shipping companies - 
their procedures and their safety policies - provided me with the wherewithal to resist the 
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agent’s attempts to get me to do something which I felt was probably [but not certainly] 
beyond my capability.  
This ‘tale from the field’ is illustrative of several issues. Firstly the risks that arose were 
unanticipated. Previous experience indicates that shipping companies, ship captains, and 
senior personnel are generally reluctant to allow researchers and visitors to take risks 
whilst on board or whilst boarding or disembarking. Once on board it became clear that 
the inexperienced captain of Pollyanna had been sufficiently concerned to make an 
attempt to get in touch with me by telephone prior to my arrival. Such attempted contact 
is unprecedented and reflected the extent of his anxiety. He told me later that he was very 
relieved that I had made the request to board using the gangway. Yet a younger, less 
experienced version of ‘me’ would not have done so. As a novice to the field I would 
have taken my cue from the agent and trusted in his confidence that climbing the ladder 
would pose no danger. Furthermore I would have been too embarrassed about my fears to 
share them and too concerned to appear undaunted and confident. 
 
The second revealing element of the situation relates to the way in which the encountered 
risk was a result of a variety of factors that related both to the conditions in the fieldsite 
and to researcher characteristics. Physical stature, age, a previous injury, and level of 
[un]fitness, combined to make this particularly hazardous in a way that it might not have 
been to another younger/fitter colleague (although it should be acknowledged that 
boarding vessels in this manner is inherently risky). In this situation only the researcher 
concerned could be aware of all the relevant factors and be in a position to properly 
assess the risk.  
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The third thing to note, is the way in which, were these events to be repeated on another 
vessel at another time, the risks would nevertheless be different. If it were wet this would 
add to the risk associated with the manoeuvre, if it were light then it might have 
diminished the risk. If the Captain had been more assertive in pursuing his concerns, and 
the agent less pushy in seeking to impose his will, all of these considerations would have 
made the degree of risk different. This highlights the extent to which risk assessments 
need to be constantly tailored to particular circumstances and how they often need to be 
initiated, or re-evaluated, once in the field. In some respects the example highlights the 
inadequacy of institutional efforts to manage such risk via formal assessments made by 
groups of people who are largely ignorant of the details of any associated research 
setting. A greater part of the risks that are faced in the field cannot be properly 
anticipated or ‘weighed’ and part of the skill in undertaking research relates to the ability 
to effectively ‘measure’ and mitigate risk. 
 
The second illustration of risk in the field that I draw upon here emphasises once again 
the unpredictable nature of such risk. However it serves to demonstrate how planning, 
good fortune, and resilience may protect a researcher in a dangerous setting. Twelve 
years before joining Pollyanna I boarded the fruit juice vessel Qui Auora as a contract 
researcher taking part in a study of transnational communities at sea. 
 
It is ironic and cautionary that in organising the research on this vessel I was, for the first 
time, joining a ship that was operated by a firm that employed somebody I had previously 
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met. It was also the first time that I had visited one of the company’s vessels prior to 
asking for permission to undertake research with them.  
The negotiations for access took place at a high level in the company. An agreement was 
reached and I was informed which of the four vessels, in the (small) fleet, I was to join. 
This was only my fourth experience of undertaking shipboard fieldwork, nevertheless, 
when I joined the vessel in Ghent, I quickly picked up the signs that something was 
amiss. Despite the early indications that this was going to be a challenging research 
journey, I made the decision to stay on board and try to iron out the problems that had 
immediately surfaced. These took the form of the captain accusing me of being a 
‘commercial spy’ within less than an hour of meeting him and banning me from the 
cargo control room where I had been beginning to chat with some of the officers6. I was 
sufficiently experienced to understand that port stays are a busy and stressful time for 
captains and thinking that this might explain the situation I made the decision not to 
abandon the research despite the inauspicious start. This proved to be a grave error.  
 
The vessel sailed from Ghent and I followed my usual routine of trying to get to know the 
seafarers with whom I had some opportunity to have contact whilst awaiting a suitable 
time to discuss a research plan with the Captain. The seafarers were friendly, if not 
expansive, and there was no indication from them of the problems to come. However, 
from the outset, the Captain was uncooperative and reluctant to allow the research to 
commence. At our first ‘formal’ meeting he told me that I could not go to the bridge (an 
                                                 
6 Being accused of ‘spying’ is not uncommon in the field but as the account will demonstrate this was not 
the Captain’s real concern. The accusation was from the outset bizarre as industrial espionage in the fruit 
juice transport industry is entirely unknown. Even as it was made I was aware that this accusation did not 
reflect the real cause of the Captain’s anxiety or antipathy 
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important site for the research) until we were ‘deep sea’ which would be about a week 
into the voyage. My only permitted contact with the seafarers, in this period, was to be 
with the ratings who I could only meet during their two fifteen minute coffee breaks. He 
explained dismissively that I would not be able to communicate with them anyway as 
their English was very poor. This was a daunting start to fieldwork that was largely 
observational and required the establishment of rapport via a great deal of ‘hanging out’ 
and ‘working’ with seafarers. Additionally I discovered that the Captain had placed me at 
a table, alone, in the officers’ mess which made conversation during meals a challenge. I 
persevered and tried to remain patient attending the coffee breaks in the ratings’ mess and 
soon establishing some rapport there via a combination of pigeon Spanish, sign language, 
ready smiles and humour. However, the peals of laughter floating down the alley to the 
officers’ mess did not go un-noticed and the Captain took further action. After one coffee 
break he approached me in the mess room. He started to pace around the room and shout 
at me. He accused me of being a spy again but this time he said I was from the ITF (the 
International Transport Workers Federation) and was spying on the crew7. He said they 
all ‘knew’ that I could speak ‘five languages’ and that they had set a trap for me that I 
had ‘fallen into’ (I have no such linguistic facility). He lied that the ratings no longer 
wanted me to join them for coffee8 and directed that I was not to go to the mess. This was 
                                                 
7 Once again the accusation that the global trade union federation would send ‘spies’ on ships was 
preposterous and the captain was also fully aware that the research venture had been vetted by the 
company operating the vessel. The ITF might pose some threat to companies not complying with wage 
agreements etc but seafarers themselves would not be threatened by ITF representatives and there have 
been no known cases of ITF staff sailing on vessels to ‘spy’ on seafarers. This was another ‘red herring’ 
from the Captain and therefore while I describe it here I do not intend to focus on accounts of ‘spying’ in 
the field 
8 This was later revealed to be untrue by ratings who invited me to join them in private and who 
welcomed my presence in their communal lounge without the Captain’s knowledge. Rapport was difficult 
to build in these settings however as German language action films were usually being watched and 
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a severe blow but things deteriorated further over the coming days as in my isolation the 
captain refused to allow me use the ship’s satellite phone (a routine practice which is cost 
neutral9) and generally took every opportunity to harass and bully me. Finally, at the end 
of the first week when a pre-arranged call from my husband to the vessel was not put 
though to me I began to be seriously concerned for my safe arrival in our destination port 
of Rio.  
 
In this situation the Captain’s behaviour was unprecedented and unpredictable. However, 
at that time mobile satellite phones were available and had I had such independent means 
of communication it would have gone a long way in both assisting me in dealing, 
psychologically, with the situation and in supporting  my safety. I became acutely aware 
of how the ‘orchestrated’ estrangement from the crew had made me more vulnerable. 
Nobody had really had the opportunity to get to know me on board and it would be 
unrealistic to imagine that I could turn to them for any kind of protection. I had already 
observed, and had been told, that the crew were afraid of the captain as I was not the only 
recipient of his bullying. Furthermore, there is a strong and sometimes documented 
tradition of seafarers not reporting issues on board (including violence) to managers or 
other personnel ashore. These contextual features and my inability to leave the field, or 
even to locate myself beyond the captain’s reach,  made the situation challenging and 
ultimately frightening (a captain has keys to every part of ‘his’ vessel including all 
cabins). I felt it was beyond my control and that it was beyond my understanding as for 
                                                 
communication was limited. I was also nervous about the consequences of the Captain finding out and I 
did not make regular visits once I judged that the situation had deteriorated beyond retrieval. 
9 Satellite phone usage can be monitored and be paid for by users including researchers 
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some reason social norms relating to interaction were not being applied. As a ‘guest’ of 
the company on board the Captain would normally ‘look after’ a researcher even where 
he might initially be suspicious of his/her intentions or actions10. This was not a case of 
entering a violent field setting or undertaking research on sensitive issues. It was a case of 
officially recognized, overt, research on a relatively prosaic topic which had been 
negotiated and agreed with a multinational corporation. 
 
Having abandoned all attempts at ‘winning the Captain over’, I focussed on coping with 
the monotony of the voyage and the hostile atmosphere he generated. Eventually I forged 
some closer links with the galley staff and a second officer who sought me out and 
provided me with a few (English language) novels he had found on board to read. 
Initially, however, I spent many hours sitting on a bench that was located on the deck just 
outside my cabin watching the ocean and hoping for signs of wildlife to provide a 
momentary distraction.  It was here that chance favoured me with a glimpse of land as we 
passed the Cape Verde islands. I was suddenly able to get a signal on my mobile phone 
and alert people at home and in my office to my predicament.  
 
This contact gave me a new sense of security on board. I felt protected by the fact that 
outsiders were now aware of the bizarre situation. There was no possibility that I could 
simply ‘disappear’ as a number of seafarers and stowaways have done previously without 
a lot of questions being asked and this was something that I had not felt so certain of 
                                                 
10 Such suspicion is relatively commonplace but normally relates to fears about feedback to the shore-side 
management 
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before11. The security became all the more important as the voyage unfolded and a 
picture began to emerge as to the possible motivation of the captain on board. From the 
outset it was apparent that he wished to keep me at some distance from the crew. The 
steward confirmed this impression in no uncertain terms when he told me the captain had 
told them all that if they talked to me they could be arrested and go to prison. He 
accompanied his account with a gesture of being handcuffed12. Subsequently the steward 
volunteered that vessels in the fleet were engaged in regularly transporting cocaine. The 
Captain had settled in Brasil, had married there, and spoke Portuguese. His vessel was on 
a regular run from Rio to Ghent. He had taken steps to delay my arrival on board when 
the vessel docked in Ghent and was subsequently in a great hurry for me to be taken 
ashore once we arrived in Rio - despite the fact that this put the company agent to a great 
deal of trouble as we arrived outside of normal office hours. The ‘jigsaw pieces’ began to 
fall into place.  
 
This experience taught me a great deal about risk, its anticipation, and its management. It 
was not to be expected that a researcher would be unfortunate enough to end up in such 
circumstances and yet it was not inconceivable either. Illegal trafficking of people and of 
prohibited goods is known to take place at sea and Captains are rarely in a position to 
resist instructions, from their office, to take a visitor on board however unwelcome or 
threatening this might be to them. Most significantly, I learned how being isolated from 
the rest of the world adds to researcher vulnerability. This led me to subsequently insist 
                                                 
11 ‘Murders regularly occur offshore — thousands of seafarers, fishermen or sea migrants die under 
suspicious circumstances annually, maritime officials say — but culprits are rarely held accountable. No 
one is required to report violent crimes committed in international waters’. (Urbina 2015) 
12 The telling thing here is that the crew completely accepted the truth in this 
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(once I was no longer a contract researcher) that all shipboard fieldworkers based within 
the Seafarers International Research Centre would have to carry a mobile satellite phone 
with them in case of emergency.  
 
I remain uncertain of the extent to which being female helped or hindered my relationship 
with the captain on board Qui Auora. I am also uncertain about the extent to which my 
nascent skills as an ethnographer were of benefit. Certainly emerging rapport, with the 
ratings, resulted in the imposition of further restrictions by the Captain rather than fewer. 
On the other hand I was invited ‘in secret’ to meet with the steward, my presence in the 
crew lounge was kept from the Captain, and my efforts to keep smiling and attempting to 
be friendly did result in hidden conversations with the chief cook and second officer 
which kept me more informed than I would otherwise have been, contributing to my 
safety. They also contributed to the preservation of my mental health as being ostracized 
in an institutional environment with no possibility of escape was something that I 
experienced as quite traumatic. Ultimately, it is evident that individual characteristics 
played some part in the situation that emerged. Whatever the risk was, in different ways 
my identity, my behaviour, and my previous experiences on board could all have 
contributed to both its amplification and mitigation.  
 
Reflecting on risk 
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These two selected experiences of risk occurred twelve years apart. In both cases the 
risks were unanticipated and in some senses impossible to anticipate13. They are drawn 
upon here as they are illustrative, in different ways, of the extent to which risk is fluid, 
unpredictable, and context specific. As such, the examples illustrate how we should not 
take a ‘silo’ or ‘containerised’ approach to risk and its assessment. It is not enough to 
consider the general risks of physical harm associated with undertaking interviews in 
participant homes, for example. We must instead consider the particular risks associated 
with particular researchers undertaking interviews in particular participants’ homes. In 
doing so we need to go beyond superficial understandings of the ways in which identity 
and visible characteristics might impact on risk and consider, in addition, ‘invisibles’ 
such as researcher experience of a particular field, researcher knowledge, researcher 
skills, and issues such as job security which can exercise an influence over decision-
making ‘on the hoof’. Today employed with a certain degree of security, and with a 
certain amount of knowledge of the field, it is unlikely that I would make the decision to 
remain aboard Qui Auora that I did in 2001. 
 
It may seem self-evident that risk is not static (Peterson 2000) in the sense that it can be 
anticipated, planned for, and mitigated in straightforward ways. However the literature to 
date has tended to emphasize the extent to which researchers can and should take steps to 
prepare for the known risks associated with fieldwork (see for example Sluka 2015, 
Bloor et al 2010, Fahie 2014). Furthermore institutions have sought to manage risks using 
                                                 
13 It was the case that inability to leave the field was a known risk but this was a workplace setting where 
the need to leave the field urgently was not properly anticipated. Unwanted behaviours such as sexual 
harassment by individuals had been anticipated and researchers did make use of strategies to mitigate 
associated risks. Leaving the setting because of a threat of violence was not regarded as a predictable risk. 
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committees with little detailed knowledge of fieldsites or researchers. These approaches 
are laudable, to some extent, and may limit organizational liability but they are rather a 
‘blunt instrument’ in the actual mitigation of ‘lived’ risk. In approaching risk 
management it is important to acknowledge that not only do social relations alter over 
time in ways that might allow risks to emerge, or conversely recede, but actors also 
change in response to the risks they meet. This might produce new risks or avert existing 
ones. For example, at a recent conference I listened to one speaker talk about the 
unanticipated emotional risk he encountered undertaking geographic work in Congo. He 
described unsolicited harrowing accounts (which had no relevance to his research 
activities) given to him by local refugees/survivors and how these had a profoundly 
negative impact on his decision making, and actions, in the field. Ultimately he had been 
left disturbed not only by the ways in which the war had destroyed people and their lives 
locally but also by the ways in which the impact of their stories had altered his own 
subsequent behaviour. Thus his experience illustrated the ways in which exposure to one 
risk (in this case graphic and harrowing accounts) can alter ‘players’ in the field such that 
new risks (loss of self-esteem) may be produced.  This is illustrative of the tangible ways 
in which risk associated with social research, in any setting (any landscape), is ‘fluid’ and 
dynamic rather than static. The ambient risks associated with particular ‘landscapes’ such 
as a war zone, a police patrol, or a vessel have readily been acknowledged as dynamic by 
researchers but the fluid nature of the risks that are associated with interaction at the 
micro level in the most prosaic of research settings have been less well-considered..  
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Finally, these experiences have given me cause to reflect on our capacity as fieldworkers 
to mitigate emergent risks. In boarding Pollyanna I found myself in a situation where I 
was able to exert very limited influence. This was challenging enough. However, had I 
been in the same context fourteen years earlier I would have felt that my choices were 
limited to either boarding by the means provided or refusing to do so and abandoning the 
field in embarrassment and at significant cost. Experience of shipboard fieldwork and 
knowledge of the industry, combined in this situation and allowed me to pursue an 
alternative course of action. As a novice in the field, I would not have known that the 
agent was not the key decision maker with regard to the safety of those boarding the 
vessel and I would not have known that it would be difficult for him to refuse to make the 
captain aware of my concerns. In seeking to influence the situation, I was sufficiently 
familiar with the industry to understand the additional leverage that I could generate with 
the use of language heavily peppered with the terms ‘safety’, ‘accident’, and ‘risk 
assessment’. In the darkness, on the water, and faced with an individual determined to 
overrule my concerns I was able to mobilise these resources to mitigate the associated 
risk. This supports existing accounts which emphasise the particular vulnerability of 
neophyte researchers in the field (e.g. Fahie 2014, Benoot and Bilsen 2015) 
 
Conclusions 
 
Whilst ethnographic fieldwork would not be immediately recognized by the public as a 
high risk occupation it is not unknown for researchers to be killed ‘in the field’ (Bloor et 
al 2008, Sluka 2015). In early 2016, newspapers reported the death of Giulio Regeni who 
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was undertaking a PhD at Cambridge. The Guardian reported that he was ‘burned, beaten 
and mutilated in a murder that bears all the hallmarks of Egypt’s security forces’ 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/24/why-was-he-killed-brutal-death-of-
italian-student-in-egypt-confounds-experts).  The 28 year-old student was in Egypt 
researching trade union activities and it is likely that his fieldwork led to his identification 
and targeting. His death is a reminder that researcher risk remains, notwithstanding the 
development of a significant body of literature relating to the subject. 
Risk in ethnographic research is complex and multifaceted. As such it is difficult to 
accurately assess the risk associated with a particular activity in isolation from a nuanced 
understanding of the researchers involved. This can rarely be achieved by a committee. 
Risks in different research settings combine in a variety of ways and depend on the 
researcher, the researched, and the broader context of the fieldsite. These risks may 
simply combine but they also have the potential to ‘amplify’ one and other (Sampson and 
Thomas 2003) which needs careful consideration. As such, it is likely to be researchers 
themselves who are best placed to examine and consider such risks. This suggests that 
risk assessment should not be reduced (as it frequently is) to a paper-based activity which 
is overseen by an ethics or similarly research-related committee within research-
orientated institutions. Rather it seems sensible to advocate that regular assessments of 
risk are incorporated into good project management and are undertaken regularly by 
research teams14 themselves, collectively, prior to (and during) engagements with the 
field. Such risk assessments need not involve formal written documents. They could be 
                                                 
14 A research team may connote a Principal Investigator (PI), Co-Investigators (Co-Is) and Research 
Assistants (RAs) or it may be a PhD candidate and their supervisor/s. It describes the individuals directly 
connected to a research study – those who are directly engaged with undertaking, or supervising, the 
research project. 
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the equivalent of ‘tool box talks’ as undertaken in other workplace settings. In the case of 
researchers, conversations at regular meetings about the next stages of the research, and 
the risks that might unfold, would be very valuable if integrated into standard practice. To 
support this process guidelines to this effect could be issued by ethics committees or 
University management. However the purpose should not be to merely ‘cover the backs’ 
of University management but to attempt to constructively impact research culture and 
practice. 
 
However, this paper also incorporates the argument that research risks are frequently 
unpredictable (see also for example Parker and O’Reilly 2013, Fahie 2014) and that they 
change as fieldwork unfolds (Peterson 2000). This fluidity is not limited to changes in the 
research setting or context (e.g. a conflict zone) however, but also depends on changes in 
the researcher and research participants. In this context, the capacity of fieldworkers to 
undertake both reflexive and effective risk assessments in the field, and at unexpected 
moments, plays a vital role in the safe conduct of research (Sluka 2015). Prior to any 
forays into the field it would be advisable for researchers to receive effective training in 
risk management and where possible to benefit from thorough briefings from others to 
whom the field is already known. These might be provided by other researchers but there 
is also scope to involve a range of professionals with relevant expertise such as public 
sector and voluntary workers. Such benefits of more general training relating to research 
risk have previously been effectively outlined elsewhere (e.g. Dickson-Swift et al 2008, 
Bloor et al 2008) but here the recommendation relates specifically to training relating to 
ongoing risk assessment in the field (see also Peterson 2000). Moreover, and most 
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significantly, it is argued that such training should seek to raise the ‘safety bar’ in 
research settings. In this sense training should be designed to empower researchers so 
that, whatever their contract status and career-stage, they find it easier to make decisions 
that limit their exposure to risk, rather than feeling under pressure to forge on regardless 
for the sake of ‘success’. To some extent, such empowerment depends on generating a 
cultural shift within research institutions (which can in part be achieved through 
appropriately designed training) such that individual researchers come to be valued more 
highly than the product of their activity. Training could also address the emergence of a 
‘macho’ research culture where this has insidiously come to dominate areas of social 
science research. Such ‘macho’ values place a premium on work which exposes 
researchers to danger, privation, and discomfort. Research relating to violence and taking 
place in dangerous settings has been acknowledged as particularly attractive to some 
researchers (Westmarland 2001) and it may appear particularly prized. Appropriate 
training can go some way to redress this imbalance in terms of the relative value of 
different research endeavours and while it is important to allow research to thrive in 
relation to both sensitive topics and dangerous fieldsites it is inadvisable to present this as 
more important than research which exposes students and staff to less danger and risk. It 
is also important for debates on research risk to encompass, more comprehensively, those 
accounts which deal with risk in more prosaic research settings. To some extent risks in 
relation to violent contexts, violent groups/individuals, and sensitive topics (Sluka 2015, 
Dickson-Swift et al 2008) are easier to anticipate (if not to deal with) and more likely to 
be actively managed than risks in more ‘everyday’ settings. Emotional risks are similarly 
predictable in particular settings and in relation to particular topics (e.g. medical settings 
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such as hospices and child abuse).  Researchers who write about risk in such settings are 
likely to feel less vulnerable to accusations of incompetently managing a situation or 
contributing to their own risk than others who write about more mundane situations 
where it may be impossible to fully explain complex research interactions/contexts in 
relatively short accounts from the field. As such it is currently research in ‘exotic’ 
settings which inevitably receives the most attention from both committees and 
individuals and this situation should be re-balanced.  
Despite the many lessons that we have been encouraged to learn from accounts of risk in 
the field, there is still some way to go before we effectively assess and mitigate danger in 
social research. In many institutions risks associated with ethnography and qualitative 
methods of inquiry remain relatively unconsidered. In some, risk management has been 
embedded in bureaucratic practices incorporated in broader measures for institutional 
research governance. Whilst this is usually (but not always) helpful, it is nevertheless 
insufficient. The emergence of greater numbers of accounts of long-term damage 
sustained by researchers in the field15  remind us of just how important this issue remains 
(Coles et al 2014, Warden 2013, Bloor et al 2008, Bloor et al 2010). The account 
presented here suggests that, notwithstanding the progress that has been made in many 
universities following earlier recommendations relating to researcher risk (e.g. Bloor et al 
2008, Peterson 2000, Lee 1995, Sluka 2015), contemporary risk management requires a 
different approach within many institutions. Here I suggest that this is one which is 
primarily rooted in training, and the ‘management’ practices of individual researchers and 
research-team leaders. It is a change of culture that is advocated not a new set of 
                                                 
15 These are quite likely to represent the ‘tip of the iceberg’ given that the construction of such accounts 
generally involves the unwelcome process of ‘re-visiting’ painful experiences 
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bureaucratic procedures, a more controlling research environment, a more comprehensive 
checklist produced by experienced researchers, or the re-design of forms.  
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